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This article provides a description of the four methods of financial 
system regulation currently in use internationally, with case studies 
illustrating each system. Analysis is provided of the strengths and 
weaknesses of each. Research indicates that the ‘Twin Peaks’ system 
is superior to its peers. However, this paper also concludes, by 
reference to failings observed in ‘Twin Peaks’ arrangements to date, 
that ‘Twin Peaks’ alone is no panacea against financial crises, or 
market and consumer abuse. It is merely the best form of regulatory 
architecture. Other factors, such as the capacity and willingness of 
the regulators to discharge their mandate, even within a sound 
regulatory architecture, are as important to the success of financial 
system regulation, as evidenced by the failures in the UK around the 
time of the Global Financial Crisis, and as evidenced by the success 
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 2 
of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, despite Singapore’s sub-




In the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis (GFC), and the 
catastrophic scale of regulatory failure, much attention has been paid 
to the various systems of financial system regulation currently in 
force. Of the total of four financial regulatory systems currently in 
use, ‘Twin Peaks’ has garnered the most interest, and gained 
widespread recognition2; as has Australia both as an exemplar of 
                                                 
 
2 Erlend W. Nier, Jacek Osiński, Luis I. Jácome & Pamela Madrid, “Institutional 
Models for Macroprudential Policy”, in IMF Staff Discussion Note, no. SDN/11/18, 
Monetary and Capital Markets Department, International Monetary Fund, 1 
November, 2011, p. 15/16. See also: De Nederlandsche Bank, “IMF publishes its 
report on financial sector and supervision in the Netherlands”, in News, De 
Nederlandsche Bank, 22 June, 2011, accessed: 9 January, 2015; Michael Taylor, 
“Regulatory reform after the financial crisis. Twin Peaks revisited”, Chap. 1, in 
Institutional Structure of Financial Regulation: Theories and International 
Experiences edited by Robin Hui Huang & Dirk Schoenmaker, in ‘Part I, 
Fundamental theories’, series editor: Routledge Research in Finance and Banking 
Law, 1st ed., 2014; Dirk Schoenmaker & Jeroen Kremers, “Financial stability and 
proper business conduct. Can supervisory structures help to achieve these 
objectives?”, Chap. 2, in Institutional Structure of Financial Regulation: Theories 
and International Experiences edited by Robin Hui Huang & Dirk Schoenmaker, in 
‘Part I, Fundamental theories’, series editor: Routledge Research in Finance and 
Banking Law, 1st ed., 2014; Professor Jeffrey Carmichael, “Implementing Twin 
Peaks. Lessons from Australia”, Chap. 5, in Institutional Structure of Financial 
Regulation: Theories and International Experiences edited by Robin Hui Huang & 
Dirk Schoenmaker, in ‘Part II, International experiences’, series editor: Routledge 
Research in Finance and Banking Law, 1st ed., 2014; Brooke Masters, “Focus on 
G20 vow to raise financial standards”, ‘Front Page’, The Financial Times, Morning 
ed., 15 October, 2009 03:00 am. 
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‘Twin Peaks’3, and in its success in navigating the worst of the GFC.4 
As a result of these factors, several countries have moved or are 
moving towards a ‘Twin Peaks’ system, most notably the Republic of 
South Africa5 (RSA) and the United Kingdom (UK).  
In an effort to place ‘Twin Peaks’ in context, this article makes 
a comparative analysis of the four systems in use, along with 
descriptive case studies. Particular attention is paid to the failings of 
the previous UK regulatory arrangement, and the success of 
Singapore, in order to demonstrate that the solution to successful 
prudential regulation, and regulatory enforcement, is not simply the 
regulatory architecture. It is as much a function of regulator culture, 
inter-agency co-ordination, and regulatory philosophy. Additional 
analysis is also provided for Germany, due to the importance of its 
banking sector.6 
The four systems are described in the following order: first, the 
institutional or traditional approach (with emphasis on China, Mexico 
and Hong Kong); second, the functional approach (with a description 
                                                 
 
3 John Trowbridge, “The Regulatory Environment - A Brief Tour”, Paper presented 
at the National Insurance Brokers Association (NIBA) Conference, Sydney, NSW, 
22 September 2009, p. 2. 
4 Kevin Davis, “The Australian Financial System in the 2000s: Dodging the Bullet”, 
Paper presented at the The Australian Economy in the 2000s Conference, Sydney, 
NSW, series editor: Hugo Gerard & Jonathan Kearns, in ‘Publications’, Conference 
Volume ed., 15-16 August 2011, pp. 301/341/344. Contra, see: Alan Erskine, 
“Regulating the Australian Financial System”, in Funding Australia’s Future, 
Australian Centre for Financial Studies, July, 2014, p. 4. 
5 A. J. Godwin & A.D. Schmulow, “The Financial Sector Regulation Bill In South 
Africa: Lessons From Australia”, South African Law Journal (forthcoming, 2015). 
6 European Central Bank, EUROSYSTEM, “Banking Structures Report”, series 
edited by European Central Bank, EUROSYSTEM, no. QB-BL-13-001-EN-N, 
European Central Bank, EUROSYSTEM, November, 2013, Chart 2, p. 6; Michiel J. 
Bijlsma & Gijsbert T. J. Zwart, “The Changing Landscape of Financial Markets in 
Europe, The United States and Japan”, in Improving economic policy, Bruegel 
Working Paper 2013/02, Bruegel, March, 2013, p. 2. 
 Andrew Schmulow 
 4 
of Italy and France); third, the integrated approach (as employed in 
Japan, Singapore, Germany, and formerly in the United Kingdom); 
and finally, fourth, the ‘Twin Peaks’ approach (as found in The 
Netherlands, Switzerland, Qatar, and Spain). 
 
II. INSTITUTIONAL, TRADITIONAL, OR SILOS 
APPROACH7 
 
This approach focuses on the form of legal entity under regulation 
and, accordingly, assigns a particular regulator. This mode of financial 
system regulation is used in China, Mexico8 and Hong Kong9. 
 
(a) China 
In the case of the People’s Republic of China, primary responsibility 
for the supervision of the banking sector was moved from the People’s 
Bank of China (China’s national central bank (BoC)), to the China 
Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) in 2003. The CBRC’s remit 
includes banks, financial asset managers, trust and investment 
companies, and other depositary financial institutions. Its 
responsibilities include approving new banking licences, formulating 
prudential rules, and conducting compliance examinations. The 
People’s Bank of China is limited to setting monetary policy and 
acting as LoLR. The China Securities Regulatory Commission 
                                                 
 
7 Darshana Rajendaran, “Approaches to Financial Regulation and the case of South 
Africa”, IFMR Finance Foundation (6 March, 2012); Ernst & Young Australia, 
“Effectiveness of Australia’s regulatory settings”, series edited by Ernst & Young 
Australia, in Report for the Financial Services Council for submission to the 
Financial System Inquiry, Financial Services Council, 2014, pp. 5/18. 
8 Working Group on Financial Supervision, “The Structure of Financial 
Supervision. Approaches and Challenges in a Global Marketplace”, series edited by 
Group of Thirty, in Special Report, Group of Thirty, Consultative Group on 
International Economic and Monetary Affairs, Inc., 2008, p. 24/5. 
9 Darshana Rajendaran, op cit. 
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(CSRC) regulates and supervises the securities and futures markets, 
and enforces sanctions.10 
In future, as financial entities in China increasingly offer 
products that ‘blur the boundaries’, thereby creating issues of 
supervisory prerogative and, by implication confusion, contradictions 
and potential conflicts are more likely to arise. 
 
(b) Mexico 
Similarly with Mexico, an institutional approach holds sway; what the 
Mexican authorities refer to as a ‘silo’ approach.11 Mexico maintains 
separate regulators for the regulation and supervision of financial 
entities, namely the National Banking and Securities Commission 
(Comisión Nacional Bancaria y de Valores) (CNBV), which is a 
decentralized entity and a division of the country’s finance ministry. 
The CNBV is responsible for maintaining and promoting the stability 
of the financial system and protecting depositors. The CNBV 
supervises and regulates all financial institutions including banks, 
non-bank finance companies, stockbrokers and mutual funds.12 The 
National Insurance and Bond Companies Commission (Comisión 
Nacional de Seguros y Fianzas) (CNSF) is responsible for regulating 
the insurance and surety bond markets,13 and the National 
Commission for the Retirement Savings System (Comisión Nacional 
del Sistema de Ahorro para el Retiro) (CONSAR) is both regulator 
and supervisor of Mexico’s pension system. Its main objective is to 
regulate private financial institutions in charge of the administration 
                                                 
 
10 China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), “About CSRC”, China 
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), 2008, accessed: 7 January, 2015. 
11 Working Group on Financial Supervision, 2008, p. 26. 
12 BNamericas, “CNBV (Comisión Nacional Bancaria y de Valores)”, series edited 
by BNamericas, in Banking, BNamericas, 1996-2014, accessed: 23 September, 
2014. 
13 BNamericas, “CNSF (Comisión Nacional de Seguros y Fianzas)”, series edited by 
BNamericas, in Insurance, BNamericas, 1996-2014, accessed: 23 September, 2014. 
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and investment of retirement savings.14 There is no consolidated 
supervision and no lead supervisor of financial groups. The National 
Commission for the Protection of Financial Services Users (Comisión 
Nacional para la Protección y Defensa de los Usuarios de Servicios 
Financieros) (CONDUSEF) is in charge of protection of consumers of 
financial services. Its main objectives are to ‘promote, advise, protect 
and defend the rights of people who use financial services offered by 
institutions operating within Mexico.’15 CONDUSEF operates under 
the authority of the Department of Finance and Public Credit, and is 
the premier consumer protection organization in Mexico. Finally there 
is the Deposit Insurance Agency (Instituto para la Protección al 
Ahorro Bancario) (IPAB), responsible for the administration of 
deposit insurance. IPAB focuses on four functions, namely: it 
guarantees bank deposits up to 400,000 Investment Units (UDIs)16; it 
implements resolutions for insolvent banks, with the objective of 
protecting depositors; acts as receiver and liquidator of assets for 
insolvent banks; and manages its own debt, primarily, through the 
issuance of Savings Protection Bonds.17 
 
(c) Hong Kong 
In Hong Kong, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) is the 
Hong Kong government’s authority charged with responsibility for 
                                                 
 
14 BNamericas, “CONSAR (Comisión Nacional del Sistema de Ahorro para el 
Retiro)”, series edited by BNamericas, in Insurance, BNamericas, 1996-2014, 
accessed: 23 September, 2014. 
15 Center for Financial Inclusion, “Client Protection in Mexico”, series edited by 
Center for Financial Inclusion, in Publications & Resources, Center for Financial 
Inclusion, 2014, accessed: 23 September, 2014. 
16 Currently set at 1,900,000.00 MXN pesos, equivalent to approximately US$ 
143,000. 
17 Instituto para la Protección al Ahorro Bancario (IPAB), “About the IPAB”, series 
edited by Instituto para la Protección al Ahorro Bancario (IPAB), Instituto para la 
Protección al Ahorro Bancario (IPAB), 2012, accessed: 23 September, 2014. 
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the maintenance of monetary and banking stability. Its main functions 
include the promotion of the stability and integrity of the financial 
system, including the banking system, the maintenance of Hong 
Kong’s status as an international financial centre, the management of 
the Exchange Fund and the maintenance and development of Hong 
Kong’s financial infrastructure.18 It is also Hong Kong’s central 
bank.19 
The HKMA enjoys a high degree of autonomy, and is 
accountable through the Financial Secretary of Hong Kong, and 
through the laws passed by the Legislative Council that set out the 
Monetary Authority’s powers and responsibilities. In his control of the 
Exchange Fund, the Financial Secretary is advised by the Exchange 
Fund Advisory Committee.20 
Securities and Futures are regulated by the Hong Kong 
Securities and Futures Commission, whose purpose is to ‘ensure 
orderly securities and futures market operations, to protect investors 
and help promote Hong Kong as an international financial centre and 
a key financial market in China.’21 It is an independent statutory 
body.22 
The institutional approach to financial system regulation tends 
towards a heavily fragmented regulatory environment, ill-equipped to 
                                                 
 
18 Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA), “The HKMA”, series edited by Hong 
Kong Monetary Authority, in About the HKMA, Hong Kong Monetary Authority, 
2014, accessed: 7 October, 2014. 
19 Hong Kong Monetary Authority, “Annual Report 2013”, series edited by Hong 
Kong Monetary Authority, in Annual Reports, Hong Kong Monetary Authority, 
2014, p. 8. 
20 Ibid, p. 1. 
21 Securities and Futures Commission, “Our role”, series edited by Securities and 
Futures Commission, in About SFC, Securities and Futures Commission, 13 March, 
2014, accessed: 7 January, 2015. 
22 Securities and Futures Ordinance, No. 5 of 2002, ss 1-409, (enacted: 27 March, 
2002), Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. 
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deal with financial entities that are hybrids, such as bank-cum-
insurers. Such hybrids then face overlapping and potentially 
contradictory regulations. In such an environment, typically, each 
regulator will be responsible for both financial system stability and 
market conduct and consumer protection issues.23 This approach is 
regarded as least capable of dealing with financial conglomerates, the 
activities of which blur the boundaries between different types of 
financial firms.24 
While it is true that the type of legal entity will determine the 
types of transactions in which it may engage, and the types of 
products it may offer, financial firms typically seek to define new 
products so as to circumvent the regulations on the types of products 
they may offer. Contemporaneously, regulators seek to broaden their 
jurisdiction to accommodate these new products.25 
‘Thus, over time, entities with different legal status have been 
permitted to engage in the same or comparable activity and be 




The functional approach pays no regard to the type of legal entity in 
question, but rather focuses on the types of transactions or products 
under regulation. Consequently, one firm engaging in multiple types 
of transactions will be subject to multiple regulators. Each regulator is 
then responsible for the safety and soundness of the firm, as well as 
the business conduct of the firm, as it applies to each type of product 
                                                 
 
23 Working Group on Financial Supervision, 2008, p. 24. 
24 Ibid, p. 13. 
25 Ibid, p. 24. 
26 Ibid, p. 24. 
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covered by the jurisdiction of each regulator.27 This approach is 
currently employed in Italy, France,28 and Brazil29. 
 
(a) Italy 
In Italy, banking, investment services, asset management, and 
insurance each have their own supervisor, legal framework, and rules. 
The Italian NCB, The Bank of Italy, sets monetary policy and is a 
member of the European System of Central Banks (Eurosystem). It is 
also the bank regulator and supervisor, and is charged with financial 
system stability.30 The Bank of Italy not only sets prudential rules and 
supervises adherence thereto, but may also impose the full range of 
sanctions in instances of breach, which includes the power of 
intervention and liquidation.31 Italy’s Companies and Stock Exchange 
Commission’s (Commissione Nazionale per le Societa e la Borsa) 
(CONSOB) focus is primarily conduct-of-business oriented, and as 
such contains an element of ‘Twin Peaks’.32 In particular CONSOB is 
responsible for: protecting the investing public, by ensuring 
transparency and correct behaviour by financial market participants; 
ensuring the disclosure of complete and accurate information to the 
investing public by listed companies; ensuring accuracy in the 
prospectuses of transferable securities offered to the public; 
compliance with regulations by auditors entered in the Special 
Register; and the conduct of investigations of potential infringements 
of insider trading and market manipulation.33 
                                                 
 
27 Ibid, p. 24. 
28 Ibid, p. 26. 
29 Ibid, p. 85. 
30 Ibid, p. 27. 
31 Banca d’Italia, “Supervisory Principles And Activities”, series edited by Banca 
d’Italia, in Supervision, Banca d’Italia, 2014, accessed: 23 September, 2014. 
32 Working Group on Financial Supervision, 2008, p. 27. 
33 Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa (CONSOB), “Consob - What it 
is and what it does”, series edited by Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la 




Similarly, France’s regulatory model is a functional one, with 
elements of ‘Twin Peaks.’ The French Prudential Supervisory 
Authority (Autorité de contrôle prudentiel et de résolution) (ACPR), 
established in January 2010, is an ‘independent administrative 
authority attached to the Banque de France’,34 which monitors the 
activities of banks and insurance companies, and provides for 
consumer protection. The ACPR acts as supervisor, regulator and 
enforcer of rules, and is also responsible for system stability.35 The 
market conduct regulator is the Autorité des Marchés Financiers 
(AMF). The AMF is an independent body responsible for 
safeguarding investments in financial products; ensuring that investors 
receive material information by way of disclosure; and the 
maintenance of orderly financial markets.36 
The obvious shortcomings of this model relate chiefly to safety 
and soundness considerations, with different regulators potentially 
taking different views on the threat posed to the financial system, of 
particular firms. Moreover, the types of activities being regulated must 
be definable with sufficient clarity, in order to determine which 
regulator has jurisdiction. 
While this system of financial regulation is common, and can 
be effective, provided there is a high degree of communication and 
                                                                                                                  
 
Borsa (CONSOB), Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa (CONSOB), 
2014, accessed: 23 September, 2014. 
34 Autorité de contrôle prudentiel et de résolution (ACPR), “Ensuring the stability of 
the financial system”, series edited by Autorité de contrôle prudentiel et de 
résolution (ACPR), in Missions, Autorité de contrôle prudentiel et de résolution 
(ACPR), 2014, accessed: 23 September, 2014. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Autorité des Marchés Financiers (AMF), “Who we are”, series edited by Autorité 
des Marchés Financiers (AMF), in Duties and Powers, Autorité des Marchés 
Financiers (AMF), 16 July, 2013, accessed: 23 September, 2014. 
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co-operation between regulators, it is nonetheless regarded as sub-
optimal.37 Again the obvious shortcoming of this approach pertains to 
hybrid financial products. In addition it is doubtful whether this 
regime can adequately address the growth, importance, and potential 
threat posed by shadow banks. 
 
IV. INTEGRATED OR UNIFIED APPROACH38 
 
Under this model there exists a single financial regulator responsible 
for both safety and soundness and business conduct considerations. 
This model is often referred to as the ‘FSA Model’, as the former 
Financial Services Authority in the UK was this model’s most 
prominent example,39 (and one to which this paper will return). This 
model differs from the ‘Twin Peaks’ model in that it combines both 
stability and business conduct considerations, whereas the ‘Twin 
Peaks’ model separates stability and market conduct oversight. 
The integrated approach is currently employed in Japan, 
Singapore, Germany and the Scandinavian countries.40 It was formerly 
employed in the UK. Under the aegis of this system, the United 
Kingdom weathered the GFC (poorly), and through various inquiries, 
declared that this mode of regulation had failed, and should be 
replaced. As an insight into this mode of regulation, the failure that it 
represented in the UK is discussed in detail, in Section IV (d) ‘The 
United Kingdom, or Pride before the fall’, below. 
 
                                                 
 
37 Working Group on Financial Supervision, 2008, p. 14. 
38 Darshana Rajendaran, op cit. 
39 Working Group on Financial Supervision, 2008, p. 24. 
40 Michael Taylor & Alex Fleming, “Integrated Financial Supervision. Lessons of 
Scandinavian Experience”, Finance & Development. A quarterly magazine of the 
IMF, Vol. 36, no. 4 (December, 1999). 
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(a) Japan 
In Japan, The Financial Services Agency is responsible for overseeing 
banking, securities and exchange, and insurance, in order to ensure the 
stability of the financial system. It is responsible for the protection of 
depositors, insurance policy holders, and securities investors. It is 
responsible for the inspection and supervision of private sector 
financial institutions, and the surveillance of securities transactions.41 
It is an external organ of the Cabinet Office of the Government of 
Japan.42 The agency is headed by a Commissioner and reports to the 
Minister of State for Financial Services.43 It has jurisdiction over the 
Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission (SESC) and the 
Certified Public Accountants and Auditing Oversight Board. Its remit 
includes the maintenance of fair and transparent financial markets, the 
protection of users of the financial system, increased user 




In Singapore, the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS), is the 
NCB, the market conduct regulator, and the prudential regulator. It is 
an ‘integrated supervisor overseeing all financial institutions in 
Singapore - banks, insurers, capital market intermediaries, financial 
advisors, and the stock exchange.’ It also promotes retail investor 
education.45 While the MAS is a unitary supervisor, it is nonetheless 
                                                 
 
41 Financial Services Agency, “Financial Services Agency”, series edited by 
Financial Services Agency, Financial Services Agency, The Japanese Government, 
p. 3. 
42 Ibid, p. 2. 
43 Ibid, p. 8. 
44 Ibid, p. 6. 
45 Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS), “About MAS”, series edited by 
Monetary Authority of Singapore, Monetary Authority of Singapore, 2014, 
accessed: 6 October, 2014. 
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highly regarded and is exceptionally effective, and maintains tight 
control of the financial sector in Singapore.46  
‘The Singaporeans have transcended the limitations of 
compliance and the heretofore dominance of risk management 
systems designed in terms of minimizing the risk to the 
institution. Instead, it has very consciously aligned the ‘end’ - 
market integrity - with the ‘purpose’ of risk management - 
protecting the public interest. Firms are assessed on their 
demonstrable capacity to protect the public interest. This very 
clever exercise in regulatory engineering, combined with 
demand to report suspicion rather than evidence of wrongdoing 
and power of compulsion, creates a Panopticon effect. It may 
also lead to warranted confidence in banking industry 
exhortations that they are committed to professional integrity. It 
is a framework that is deserving of attention47 and emulation.’48 
‘“The inspections and reprimands from the Monetary Authority 
of Singapore are everything,” a European banking veteran 
said. “Not respecting the rules risks huge fines, and even 
prison.”’49 
There is, therefore, something to be said for organisational 
culture in the degree of efficacy of the regulator; be it of the system 
stability or the market conduct type. Consequently, while the 
Singaporean regime is sub-optimal (although not the least effective – 
this dubious honour is reserved for the institutional approach), there is 
                                                 
 
46 See for example Justin O’Brien, “Singapore Sling: How coercion may cure the 
hangover in financial benchmark governance”, Journal of Risk Management in 
Financial Institutions, Vol. 7, no. 2 (Spring, 2014). 
47 Ibid, p. 184. 
48 Justin O’Brien, “Singapore Sling: How Coercion May Cure the Hangover in 
Financial Benchmark Governance”, series edited by Centre for Law, Markets and 
Regulation, in CLMR Research Paper Series, in Working Paper No. 13-7, Faculty of 
Law, University of New South Wales, October, 2013, p. 15/16. 
49 Tax Justice Network, “Singapore: The Rise and Rise of Asia’s Switzerland”, 
series edited by Tax Justice Network, Tax Justice Network, 30 January, 2014, 
accessed: 6 October, 2014. 
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evidence that that sub-optimality is mitigated by the aggressive and 
‘no-nonsense’ manner in which the Singaporean authorities approach 
their responsibilities. As an example, in 2011, DBS, the Development 
Bank of Singapore, suffered an automatic-teller outage, which lasted a 
mere seven hours (3 am to 10 am), of which only one and a half hours, 
fell during normal business hours of operation. Nonetheless they were 
punished by the MAS, which required DBS to hold an additional 
S$230 million capital buffer against operational risk.50 DBS was 
required to maintain this additional (and effectively non-profit 
generating) capital until October of the following year. 
As a key economic pillar, banks are expected to keep their 
services up and running all the time. MAS has emphasised this 
point in its IBTRM guidelines, saying users expect online 
banking services to be accessible ‘24 hours every day of the 
year’ and this is ‘tantamount to near-zero system downtime’.51 
This contrasts starkly with the manner in which the British 
authorities, albeit possessed of a better regulatory model, managed to 
produce far less beneficial outcomes among their regulated entities. 
By way of contradistinction with the Singapore model, we discuss the 
British experience leading up to the Global Financial Crisis, and the 
role of the ‘light touch’ approach to regulation, below. 
 
(c) Germany 
In Germany the Deutsche Bundesbank (DB) and the Federal Financial 
Supervisory Authority (BaFin) are responsible for system stability, 
and a smoothly functioning banking supervision regime. The DB’s 
regulatory philosophy is one of safeguarding the viability of the 
                                                 
 
50 Development Bank of Singapore, “Media Statement”, Newsroom, (5 July, 2010), 
(accessed: 28 November, 2014), published electronically; Cesar Tordesillas, “MAS 
lifts penalty on DBS bank for online disruption”, Asian Banking & Finance, (30 
October, 2011), (accessed: 28 November, 2014), published electronically.  
51 Anonymous, “‘Give public a full account’”, VRForums, (13 July, 2010, 9:27 pm), 
(accessed: 28 November, 2014), published electronically. 
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financial sector, which is sensitive to fluctuations in confidence, by 
pursuing creditor (note, not purely depositor) protection.  
The intensity of supervision depends on the type and scale of 
the regulated entity’s business52, that is to say, in essence, its risk 
profile (a risk-based supervision regime). In this regard, the regulator 
concentrates its attention on whether institutions maintain adequate 
capital and liquidity, and on whether they have appropriate risk 
control mechanisms.53 
The division of supervision between these two entities, in its 
most simple form, is that BaFin is the lead supervisor, whereas the 
Bundesbank is responsible for macro-prudential supervision.54 
BaFin’s supervisory guidelines are issued in consultation with the 
Bundesbank, and co-operation between the two is mandated by the 
Banking Act55. 
The supervisory guidelines delineate areas of authority and are 
intended to prevent overlap. The delineation remits to the Bundesbank 
the function of ongoing monitoring, pursuant to section 7 (1) of the 
Banking Act, within the framework of the Supervisory Review and 
                                                 
 
52 Deutsche Bundesbank Eurosystem, “Motives and aims”, series edited by 
Deutsche Bundesbank, in Banking supervision, Deutsche Bundesbank, 7 August, 
2014, accessed: 9 October, 2014. 
53 Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin) (Bundesanstalt für 
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht), “Banks & financial services providers”, series edited 
by Federal Financial Supervisory Authority, in Supervision, Federal Financial 
Supervisory Authority, accessed: 10 October, 2014. 
54 Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin) (Bundesanstalt für 
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht), “Supervision Guideline, Guideline on carrying out 
and ensuring the quality of the ongoing monitoring of credit and financial services 
institutions by the Deutsche Bundesbank of 21 May 2013”, series edited by Federal 
Financial Supervisory Authority, in Cooperation between BaFin and Deutsche 
Bundesbank, Federal Financial Supervisory Authority, 21 May, 2013, accessed: 10 
October, 2014. 
55 S 7 (1), Banking Act (Kreditwesengesetz, KWG), Federal Law Gazette I No. 54, 
page 2384, 1999, (enacted: 8 December), (Federal Republic of Germany). 
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Evaluation Process (SREP). The monitoring function, in turn, 
comprises ascertaining facts, analysing the information received and 
collected, evaluating current and potential risks based upon that 
information, and appraisals of audit findings. The Bundesbank 
performs its monitoring function, while taking account of findings 
from its macro-prudential inquiries, in accordance with the Financial 
Stability Act (Gesetz zur Überwachung der Finanzstabilität 
(FinStabG))56, as well as the guidelines, warnings and 
recommendations of the relevant European Union institutions and the 
Committee for Financial Stability (CFS).57  
The CFS has a broad range of powers and responsibilities 
contained in its enabling provision,58 most notably overall financial 
stability (including the causes of potential future crises), and inter-
agency co-ordination and co-operation. 
Information obtained from supervision and analysis of audits 
is evaluated in order that the Bundesbank may construct a risk profile 
of a regulated entity. The risk profile includes an institution’s risks, its 
organisation and internal control procedures and an assessment of its 
risk-bearing capacity.59 
                                                 
 
56 Financial Stability Act (Gesetz zur Überwachung der Finanzstabilität, FinStabG), 
Federal Law Gazette I, page 2369, 2012, (enacted: 28 November), (Federal Republic 
of Germany). 
57 Established pursuant to s 2, ibid, on 18 March, 2013. Federal Financial 
Supervisory Authority (BaFin) (Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht), 
“Financial Stability Commission”, series edited by Federal Financial Supervisory 
Authority, in Expert articles, Federal Financial Supervisory Authority, 15 April, 
2013, accessed: 10 October, 2014. 
58 Section 2, Financial Stability Act (Gesetz zur Überwachung der Finanzstabilität, 
FinStabG), 2012. 
59 Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin) (Bundesanstalt für 
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht), “Supervision Guideline, Guideline on carrying out 
and ensuring the quality of the ongoing monitoring of credit and financial services 
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BaFin makes the final summation and assessment of whether 
the risks that a given institution has assumed are matched by its 
policies, strategies, procedures and mechanisms aimed at ensuring 
sound risk-management, and whether the institution has ensured that 
the risks that it has assumed are matched by adequate capital. The 
primary basis for these assessments is, therefore, the institution’s risk 
profile.60 
Notwithstanding the Bundesbank’s authority to evaluate 
regulated entities, the final decision on all supervisory matters and 
questions of interpretation rests with BaFin. In reaching its decision, 
BaFin is expected to draw on the Bundesbank’s advice.61 
 
(d) The United Kingdom, or Pride before the fall 
Prior to the GFC, this model enjoyed a high degree of support, 
particularly for smaller economies, where it was deemed a reasonably 
effective method for the regulator to gain oversight of a broad range 
of financial services.62 In larger, more complex markets, this method 
of regulation had demonstrated a strength in its ability to offer what 
was regarded as a streamlined and flexible approach.63 In addition, it 
presented a unified focus on regulation and supervision, without 
giving rise to jurisdictional disputes,64 or the possibility of regulatory 
arbitrage. At the time its principle shortcoming was regarded as its 
capacity to present ‘a single point of regulatory failure.’65  
The after effects of the GFC in the UK, however, exposed 
flaws and repeated and serious failures on the part of the regulator; 




62 Working Group on Financial Supervision, 2008, p. 14. 
63 Ibid, p. 14. 
64 Ibid, p. 14. 
65 Ibid, p. 14. 
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failures that provide an insight into the critical shortcomings of this 
method of regulation. 
The United Kingdom, (which has now moved to its own 
version of the ‘Twin Peaks’ model) had its erstwhile integrated 
regulatory regime held-up as an exemplar of excellence in financial 
regulation. The Financial Services Authority (FSA) was responsible 
for both prudential regulation and enforcement, and market conduct. 
On the eve of the GFC it was described by the Group of Thirty’s 2008 
Report as: 
… a model of  an efficient and effective regulator, not only 
because of its streamlined model of regulation, but also because 
it adheres to  a series of “principles of good regulation,” 
which center on efficiency and economy, the role of 
management, proportionality, innovation, the international 
character of financial services, and competition. This overlay of 
pragmatic business principles, in addition to the traditional 
goals of regulation, has been a distinguishing feature of the 
U.K. regulatory approach.66 
That analysis was provided prior to the Global Financial 
Crisis, and the collapse of notable British banks such as Northern 
Rock, Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) and Halifax Bank of Scotland 
(HBOS)67. At the time of its collapse HBOS was one of Britain’s ‘big 
four’ banks and, consequently, its failure represented a systemic-threat 
event for the UK’s economy.  
                                                 
 
66 Ibid, p. 28/29. 
67 The Bank of Scotland (BOS), founded in 1695, was merged in 2001 with Halifax, 
a 150-year-old building society that had recently converted to a bank. The new 
entity became known as HBOS (Halifax Bank of Scotland). This catapulted HBOS 
into the ‘big four’ of UK banks. Pat McConnell, “Reckless endangerment: The 
failure of HBOS”, Journal of Risk Management in Financial Institutions, Vol. 7, no. 
2 (1 April, Spring 2014), p. 204. 
Approaches to Financial System Regulation 
 19 
After the GFC, the FSA was described as ‘thoroughly 
inadequate’68 in its oversight of HBOS by the House of Lords, House 
of Commons Commission. The Commission stated in its conclusion 
that: 
… the FSA was not so much the dog that did not bark as a dog 
barking up the wrong tree. The requirements of the Basel II 
framework not only weakened controls on capital adequacy by 
allowing banks to calculate their own risk-weightings, but they 
also distracted supervisors from concerns about liquidity and 
credit; they may also have contributed to the appalling 
supervisory neglect of asset quality. The FSA’s attempts to raise 
concerns on these other fronts from late 2007 onwards proved 
to be a case of too little, too late69 … The experience of the 
regulation of HBOS demonstrates the fundamental weakness in 
the regulatory approach prior to the financial crisis and as that 
crisis unfolded. … The regulatory approach encouraged a focus 
on box-ticking which detracted from consideration of the 
fundamental issues with the potential to bring the bank down. 
The FSA’s approach also encouraged the Board of HBOS to 
believe that they could treat the regulator as a source of 
interference to be pushed back, rather than an independent 
source of guidance and, latterly, a necessary constraint upon 
the company’s mistaken courses of action.70  
At the time the FSA failed to understand the pernicious nature 
of HBOS’s funding:71 HBOS had returned spectacularly high rates of 
                                                 
 
68 House of Lords, House of Commons, “‘An accident waiting to happen’: The 
failure of HBOS”, in 5: A failure of regulation, in HL Paper 144 HC 705, Vol. I, 
Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards Fourth Report, Parliament of the 
United Kingdom, 5 April, 2013, § 83, p. 28. 
69 Ibid, § 84, p. 28. 
70 Ibid, § 85, p. 28. See also: Financial Services Authority, “The failure of the Royal 
Bank of Scotland”, in Financial Services Authority Board Report, Financial Services 
Authority, December, 2011, § 30, p. 28. 
71 See: Financial Services Authority, December, 2011, § 30, p. 28. 
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return on equity through aggressive lending – in excess of 20 per 
cent,72 and the Bank’s Corporate Division had seen an increase in 
assets (in other words loans to borrowers) of 26 per cent in 2002 
alone.73  
However, such a rapid growth in assets was not matched by 
traditional customer deposits and HBOS was forced to turn to 
the short-term wholesale markets to cover its funding gap. As 
early as 2002, the UK banking regulator, the Financial 
Services Authority (FSA), raised concerns about the bank’s 
funding strategy, returning in 2003 to express disappointment 
that the warnings had not been properly heeded, and also 
increasing the bank’s capital requirement by 0.5 per cent.74 
In response, the HBOS Board simply dismissed the regulator’s 
concerns as unwarranted. By 2009, and in the aftermath of the GFC, 
HBOS could no longer raise capital in the wholesale funding markets, 
and the Board of HBOS engineered that the bank be taken-over by 
Lloyds TSB.75 A bank that had operated for 350 years ceased to exist. 
By the time the Lloyds take-over had been digested, and more 
conservative accounting standards employed, it became apparent that 
£ 25 billion of Corporate Division loans were impaired, a staggering 
20 per cent of HBOS’s Corporate Division loan book.76 The graph 
below provides a comparison of non-performing loans in Australia, 
Canada, the UK, the Eurosystem, the remainder of Europe, and the 
USA over the same period. 
                                                 
 
72 Pat McConnell, op cit, p. 205. 
73 Ibid, p. 205. 
74 Ibid, p. 205. 
75 In 1995 Lloyds Bank merged with the Trustee Savings Bank and from 1999 to 
2013 traded as Lloyds TSB Bank plc. Today it trades as Lloyds Bank plc. 
76 Pat McConnell, op cit, p. 205/6. 




At the time the FSA had developed what came to be termed 
the ‘light touch’ approach to regulation – an approach exemplified as 
one that regarded banking as a favoured industry, and sought to 
impose the lowest possible regulatory burden on banks.78 This policy 
significantly contributed to the financial crisis in the UK.  
                                                 
 
77 Reserve Bank of Australia, “Financial Stability Review March 2012”, series 
edited by Reserve Bank of Australia, in Financial Stability Review, Information 
Department, Reserve Bank of Australia, 27 March, 2012, p. 16. 
78 Anonymous, “Light touch no more”, ‘Britain’, The Economist, 1 December, 
2012; Roger Alford, “Some Help Understanding Britain’s Banking Crisis, 2007-
09”, series edited by LSE Financial Markets Group, in LSE Financial Markets 
Group Paper Series, report number: Special Paper 193, LSE Financial Markets 
Group, London School of Economics and Political Science, the University of 
London, October, 2010, p. 1. 
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In its short life, the FSA failed to rein in the banks, and even 
encouraged the City to explode in the mid-2000s with a “light 
touch” approach to regulation. It did not notice that Northern 
Rock was built on such shaky foundations that it could easily 
run out of money, and failed to prevent the takeover of ABN 
Amro by RBS just as the credit crunch was biting in late 2007.79 
As an indication of just how blinded the FSA was to the extent 
of the crisis metastasizing in the UK, its report into the RBS 
acquisition of ABN Amro – an acquisition which was disastrous for 
RBS, and which culminated in the bank’s collapse – asserted that: 
[w]hile RBS’s governance, systems and controls and decision-
making may have fallen short of best practice, and below the 
practices of a number of peer firms, the FSA could not take 
action where decisions made or systems in place were not 
outside the bounds of reasonableness given all the 
circumstances at the time, including FSA awareness of issues 
and the approach it took at that time. The FSA may not apply 
standards of conduct retrospectively against the firms and 
individuals it regulates, on the basis that to do so would raise 
serious issues of unfairness.80 
These assertions however, appear open to question. First, if it 
is the regulator’s responsibility to regulate in order to prevent future 
crises, or at least to prevent systemic weaknesses if it cannot prevent 
individual firm weakness, then one must rightly conclude that warning 
signs were either missed or left unheeded. The ‘light touch’ culture 
within the regulatory agencies would support the latter conclusion. 
Second, it is suggested that the failure to prosecute is not only a 
function of the prohibition on retrospectivity; it is also a function of 
legislative drafting that is not termed broadly enough to punish – 
criminally - past reckless conduct. It is of note also that the RBS-ABN 
                                                 
 
79 Jill Treanor, “Farewell to the FSA – and the bleak legacy of the light-touch 
regulator”, ‘Business’, The Guardian/The Observer, 24 March, 2013. 
80 Financial Services Authority, December, 2011, § 40, p. 31. 
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Amro deal went through after the wholesale money markets, upon 
which RBS relied through its subsidiary, NatWest81, had become 
paralysed,82 and four weeks after the run on Northern Rock. All of 
which point to a regulator asleep at the wheel. 
The FSA report acknowledged the poor timing of the ABN 
Amro deal, and by implication their complicity in allowing the deal to 
proceed.83  
In his foreword to the FSA report on the RBS-ABN Amro 
takeover, Lord Turner, FSA Chairman, stated that readers of the report 
may be surprised to find that prior to the takeover, RBS had procured 
two lever-arch folders and a CD84 as the sum total of their due 
diligence. Hosking’s response to this point is to argue that: 
His suggestion is clear: if only RBS had garnered more 
information, if only there had been more lever-arch files, 
disaster might have been averted. This is the philosophy of the 
deluded bureaucrat. If only there had been more reports, more 
meetings; if only more boxes had been ticked, more forms filled 
in. On the Origin of Species, the Bible and the collected works 
of Shakespeare could be contained in two lever-arch folders 
and a CD. How much more information does Lord Turner think 
RBS needed? … It’s not volume of information that matters. It’s 
quality.85 
                                                 
 
81 Anonymous, “Lest we forget: British banking during the global financial crisis”, 
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In the three and a half years prior to RBS’s collapse, the FSA 
met with RBS 511 times.86 But, again, as Hosking points out:  
It’s typical that there is someone to count them, but no one to 
explain what on earth went on in them ... would [it] have been 
better had there been a thousand? The FSA tells us that 0.5 of 
an FSA manager and 4.5 team members were assigned to RBS 
as it was mounting the bid.87 The clipboard-hugging precision 
of those decimals speaks volumes … The report is a blizzard of 
acronyms and bogus science: RBS was scored as a “medium 
high minus”88 risk, whatever that is …89 
There were other notable examples of regulatory failure that 
emerged after the GFC, such as price-manipulation of the London 
Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR). The Parliamentary Select 
Committee investigation into LIBOR found, inter alia, that: 
The manipulation was spotted neither by the FSA nor the Bank 
of England at the time. That doesn’t look good90 … It will be a 
great step forward if the regulators get away from box-ticking 
and endless data collection and instead devote more careful 
thought to where risk really lies… It will involve a change in 
culture on the part of the regulators and is a major challenge 
for the future.91 
Glaringly inconsistencies were exposed: the FSA had 
pressured Barclays CEO Bob Diamond to step down, over his bank’s 
role in rigging the LIBOR. But as the Treasury Select Committee 
                                                 
 
86 Financial Services Authority, December, 2011, Part 2, Chap. 3, p. 277. 
87 For original reference, see: ibid, Table 2.18, p. 280. 
88 Ibid, Part 2, Chap. 3, p. 260. 
89 Patrick Hosking, op cit. 
90 Chairman Andrew Tyrie’s Comments, Treasury Select Committee, “Treasury 
Committee publishes LIBOR report”, series edited by Commons Select Committees, 
in Treasury Committee, News, House of Lords, House of Commons, Parliament of 
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found, this was in response to public pressure and not, for example, 
the FSA’s Final Notice,92 issued to Barclays, some twelve months 
earlier.93 
On Monday night, Adair Turner, chairman of the FSA, called 
Barclays asking that “any obstacle” be removed in resolving 
the crisis, according to a person familiar with the matter. Mr. 
Diamond tendered his resignation shortly after.94 
In its findings, the Commission of Inquiry into the LIBOR 
rigging, as recently as 2013 – fully five years after the GFC – found 
that: 
[T]he scale and breadth of regulatory failure was also 
shocking. International capital requirements led to the FSA 
becoming mired in the process of approving banks’ internal 
models to the detriment of spotting what was going on in the 
real business. … They neglected prudential supervision in 
favour of a focus on detailed conduct matters … the FSA left the 
UK poorly protected from systemic risk. Multiple scandals also 
reflect their failure to regulate conduct effectively. (Paragraph 
931).95 
In the aftermath of the GFC one of the conclusions reached on 
the performance of the FSA found, inter alia, that: 
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On occasions [the tripartite system, namely the Bank of 
England, H.M. Treasury, and the FSA] functioned with jaw-
dropping incompetence and chaos.96 
Serious regulatory failure has contributed to the failings in 
banking standards. The misjudgement of the risks in the pre-
crisis period was reinforced by a regulatory approach focused 
on detailed rules and process which all but guaranteed that the 
big risks would be missed. Scandals relating to mis-selling by 
banks were allowed to assume vast proportions, in part because 
of the slowness and inadequacy of the regulatory response.97 
What this belies was that prior to the GFC, the FSA had fallen 
prey to form over function; to process over outcomes. Its Approved 
Persons Regime was described as a ‘flagrant’ failure.98  
Prior to the GFC, the UK regulatory authorities had moved to 
a principles-based as opposed to a rules-based approach to regulation. 
That is to say, the FSA laid out a set of principles, primarily related to 
risk, and allowed financial firms to decide how to address those 
principles. 
Firms’ managements – not their regulators – are responsible 
for identifying and controlling risks. A more principles-based 
approach allows them increased scope to choose how they go 
about this. In short, the use of principles is a more grown-up 
approach to regulation than one that relies on rules.99 
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By 2009, John Turner’s successor, Hector Sants, had 
abandoned the principles-based approach, stating at the time that ‘A 
principles-based approach does not work with individuals who have 
no principles.’100  
In response to these findings, Black and Baldwin provide a 
spirited defence of risk-based regulation, that is to say, regulation that 
is principles-based. Evidently they have failed to learn from the 
experience of the UK and, it appears, the school of thought to which 
they subscribe is anything but out of fashion.101 They argue, for 
example, that regulators need to be responsive to, inter alia, ‘regulated 
firms’ behavior, attitude, and culture.’102 Admirable a goal as that may 
appear to be, it neglects the fact that regulating behaviour, attitude and 
culture is highly subjective, least able to be quantified, and therefore 
susceptible to regulatory forbearance, and susceptible to industry and 
political pressure.  
In defence of their position, Black and Baldwin assert that 
risk-based regulation should not be regarded as completely discredited 
by the financial crisis that befell the UK, because similar crises did not 
befall other countries in which risk-based regulation was also 
employed, such as Australia or Canada.103  
It is argued, however, that it was not risk-based regulation that 
failed to fail, as it were, in Australia or Canada. Rather it was more 
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conservative banking strategies, less prone to highly derived, opaque 
and esoteric investment instruments, than risk-based regulation, that 
saved those two countries.104 Put differently, Australia and Canada 
survived the GFC not because of the efficacy of risk-based 
regulations, but through sheer good luck105 – Australian banks’ under-
exposure to the CDO market, coupled with targeted, government 
largesse.106 
Clearly not all the blame for the failure of HBOS or RBS can 
or should be laid at the feet of the FSA. In the case of HBOS’s, the 
Board of Directors must shoulder a significant degree of blame as 
well. But it is in the nature of the failings of the conduct of HBOS’s 
directors that we find further evidence of the failure of a system that 
seeks to manage risk, not conduct. The House of Lords, House of 
Commons Commission had this to say: 
The corporate governance of HBOS at board level serves as a 
model for the future, but not in the way in which Lord 
Stevenson and other former Board members appear to see it. It 
represents a model of self-delusion, of the triumph of process 
over purpose.107 … We are shocked and surprised that, even 
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after the ship has run aground, so many of those who were on 
the bridge still seem so keen to congratulate themselves on their 
collective navigational skills.108 
Summarising the entire debacle, and the challenges it 
presented to the very foundations of financial system safety, Andy 
Haldane109 stated: 
For the most part the financial crisis was not the result of 
individual wickedness or folly. It is not a story of pantomime 
villains and village idiots. Instead the crisis reflected a failure 
of the entire system of [the UK’s] financial sector 
governance.110 
The FSA has now been dissolved, and replaced with a separate 
market conduct authority, the Financial Conduct Authority111, and a 
separate bank regulator, the Prudential Regulation Authority112, a 
division of the Bank of England. Put differently the UK has, as a 
result, adopted a ‘Twin Peaks’ system. 
What this indicates is that the authorities, in the UK at least, 
have rejected the integrated approach as inadequate to the task. The 
failures of the FSA, however, cannot be ascribed to the design of the 
regulatory architecture alone. Pervasive and profound shortcomings in 
the organisational culture of the FSA played a significant role in its 
failures and, it is argued, these would be addressed, only in part, by 
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reforming the regulatory regime.113 Thus far, that message has been 
lost because the most recent incarnation of the prudential regulator 
presents a case of déjà vu: its location as a division of the Bank of 
England. 
After the failure of the venerable Barings Bank in 1995, 
regulation (or more correctly, self-regulation) of the banking 
industry in the UK was ripped away from the Bank of England 
… In the new structure, prudential regulation was hived off to 
the Prudential Regulatory Authority (PRA) and, in an 
illustration that governments never learn the lessons of history, 
this body was handed back to the Bank of England...114 
One aspect mitigating the likelihood of regulatory capture, and 
consequently forbearance is, therefore, the location of the regulator, 
and the degree of independence that the regulator enjoys: in effect the 
degree to which the regulator is insulated from political and industry 
pressure or interference. In this respect this writer is firmly of the view 
that a ‘non-monopolist approach’ – in which the regulator is a separate 
entity from the NCB - like that followed in Australia, but unlike that 
followed in the UK, is preferable. It bears repeating however, that 
post-FSA, the regulator has again been located within the Bank of 
England, and this, it is argued, is sub-optimal.  
In response to the failures of principles-based regulation, 
regulators in the United Kingdom have embraced instead a 
judgement-based system of regulation.115 That is to say that, instead of 
measuring banks risk against a set of stated principles, regulators will 
instead exercise their discretion to ensure that problems are tackled 
                                                 
 
113 See, in agreement: House of Lords, House of Commons, “Changing banking for 
good”, 12 June, 2013, § 238, “Civil sanctions and powers of enforcement over 
individuals”, p. 65. 
114 Pat McConnell, “After a long line of financial disasters, UK banks on regulatory 
change”, ‘Business & Economy’, The Conversation, 9 April, 2013. 
115 House of Lords, House of Commons, “Changing banking for good”, 12 June, 
2013, § 37, “Risks to the competitiveness of the UK banking sector”, p. 21. 
Approaches to Financial System Regulation 
 31 
early – in theory. But, it is argued, a judgement-based approach is 
malleable, subjective, and open to political and market pressure. 
Indeed, as Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache point out: 
When we explore the relationship between soundness and 
compliance with specific groups of principles, which refer to 
separate areas of prudential supervision and regulation, we 
continue to find no evidence that good compliance is related to 
improved soundness. If anything, we find that stronger 
compliance with principles related to the power of supervisors 
to license banks and regulate market structure are associated 
with riskier banks.116 
Further complicating the issue of financial regulation in the 
UK under the new regime, is the establishment of a third body, the 
Financial Policy Committee (FPC), the remit of which is to look for 
the roots of the next crisis.117 Its remit is to identify, monitor and take 
action to remove or reduce systemic risks. It has a secondary 
objective, which is to support the economic policy of the 
Government.118  
The FPC is a statutory sub-committee of Court of the Bank of 
England, and its members include the Governor, three of the Deputy 
Governors, the Chief Executive of the Financial Conduct Authority 
(FCA), the Bank’s Executive Director for Financial Stability, Strategy 
and Risk, four external members appointed by the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, and a non-voting representation of the Treasury.119 
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Of course, in regulation, one can never have enough acronyms 
and to oversee these two new regulators there is yet another 
regulator, the FPC (or Financial Policy Committee) which is to 
be part of the Bank of England. In other words: BOE 2, FSA 
0.120 
 
V. TWIN PEAKS 
 
This method is exemplified by regulation by objective. As the name 
suggests, this regime comprises two regulators, whose objectives are, 
alternatively, systemic stability, and market conduct and consumer 
protection.121 Examples include Australia, the Netherlands122 
Switzerland,123 Qatar, and Spain. Italy, France, and the USA have 
indicated an interest in adopting this method of financial regulation, 
the UK has adopted ‘Twin Peaks’, and South Africa is well advanced 
towards adoption.124 
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(a) The Netherlands 
The Kingdom of the Netherlands was second to adopt a ‘Twin Peaks’ 
approach in 2002125, retaining prudential supervision within De 
Nederlandsche Bank N.V.126 (‘The Dutch Bank’ (DNB)). This is 
similar to the arrangement in the UK, but in contradistinction to 
Australia, where the prudential regulator (APRA) is separate from the 
NCB. 
While it is asserted that the Netherlands fared relatively well 
during the GFC, success for the Dutch authorities in staving-off a 
financial crisis in an economy with such an important financial sector, 
was not achieved without drastic government intervention.  
Total foreign claims of Dutch banks amounted to over 300% of 
GDP. The Dutch financial system therefore depended heavily 
on external developments. Only the Belgian and Irish banking 
sectors were in a similar position. The European average was 
less than half the Dutch figure at 135% of GDP. … exposure of 
Dutch banks to the United States also was the highest in 
Europe, at 66% of GDP. … whereas the average of European 
banks had kept limited exposure of less than 30% of GDP. By 
contrast, the exposure of Dutch banks to hard-hit Eastern 
                                                 
 
125 International Monetary Fund, “Kingdom of the Netherlands-Netherlands: 
Publication of Financial Sector Assessment Program Documentation—Technical 
Note on Financial Sector Supervision: The Twin Peaks Model”, in Financial Sector 
Assessment Program Update, no. IMF Country Report No. 11/208, Monetary and 
Capital Markets Department, International Monetary Fund, July, 2011, Table 1, p. 6. 
126 De Nederlandsche Bank, “DNB Supervisory Strategy 2010 - 2014”, series edited 
by De Nederlandsche Bank, in Supra-institutional perspective, strategy and culture, 
De Nederlandsche Bank, April, 2010, p. 21; Eddy Wymeersch, “The Structure of 
Financial Supervision in Europe: About Single Financial Supervisors, Twin Peaks 
and Multiple Financial Supervisors”, European Business Organization Law Review 
(EBOR), Vol. 8, no. 2 (June, 2007), p. 16. 
 Andrew Schmulow 
 34 
European countries was at 11% of GDP just above the 
European average of 8% of GDP.127 
Intervention during the crisis took the form of measures to 
stimulate employment through construction and housing (€ 6 billion); 
capital injections for banks and insurers (€ 20 billion); state 
guarantees for banks (€ 200 billion); a guarantee on all deposits up to 
€100,000128; the nationalisation of the Fortis/ABN AMRO (€ 16.8 
billion) and ING banking groups (€ 10 billion), comprising 85 per 
cent of the Dutch banking sector,129 and the SNS REAAL insurance 
and banking group (€ 3.7 billion)130; and a reform of the financial 
system and the capital levels that had been enforced to date. 
Thereafter the Dutch government was compelled to drastically reduce 
spending in order to reduce its deficit.131  
In the aftermath of the crisis, the conclusions reached about the 
performance of the Dutch regulators were less than positive: 
Both in the run-up to and during the credit crisis, supervisory 
instruments fell short in several areas. These deficiencies 
emerged in both the scope and the substance of supervision. 
The trend towards lighter supervision, reflecting developments 
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within the financial sector as well as changed social attitudes, 
has gone too far.132 
This finding supports the conclusions reached in the analysis 
of the performance of the UK regulatory authorities during the GFC, 
namely that regulatory architecture alone is not a panacea against 
financial crisis. Doubtless regulatory architecture is part of the 
solution, but no more so than the capacity of the regulator to foresee, 
at times, the unforeseeable, and regulate accordingly, and the 
willingness of the regulator to enforce its regulations. 
  
(b) Switzerland 
In the case of Switzerland, the Swiss National Bank is responsible for 
financial stability. The Swiss National Bank (SNB) defines a stable 
financial system as ‘a system whose individual components – 
financial intermediaries and the financial market infrastructure – fulfil 
their respective functions and prove resistant to potential shocks.’133  
Oversight of systemically important payment and securities 
settlement systems is assigned to the SNB. In this regard the SNB co-
operates with the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority 
(FINMA), pursuant to a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with 
clear divisions of the individual mandates of the two institutions. The 
MoU also regulates this co-operation.134 
The SNB acts as lender of last resort (LoLR), by providing 
liquidity assistance against collateral, should domestic banks no 
longer be able to refinance their open-market operations. The 
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supervision of the banking sector is the responsibility of the Swiss 
Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA).135 
FINMA’s remit is the protection of creditors, investors and 
policyholders and the maintenance of the smooth functioning of 
financial markets. FINMA is responsible for supervision and 
regulation of participants in the financial markets.136 
FINMA has authority over banks, insurers, stock exchanges, 
securities dealers, collective investment schemes, distributors and 
insurance intermediaries. It issues licenses and is responsible for 
combating money laundering. In addition it imposes sanctions and, 
where necessary, conducts restructuring and bankruptcy proceedings. 
FINMA supervises ‘disclosure of shareholdings, conducts 
proceedings, issues rulings and, where wrongdoing is suspected, files 
criminal complaints with the Swiss Federal Department of Finance 
(FDF).’137 It supervises public takeover bids and acts as an appeals 
tribunal against decisions of the Swiss Takeover Board (TOB). It 
participates in the legislative process, issues ordinances where 
authorised, ‘publishes circulars concerning the interpretation and 
application of financial market laws, and is responsible for the 
recognition of self-regulatory standards.’138 
 
(c) Qatar 
In Qatar the Qatar Financial Markets Authority (QFMA) is an 
independent regulatory authority, established to supervise financial 
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markets and securities firms. It is empowered to exercise regulatory 
oversight and regulatory enforcement over the capital markets. Its 
remit is to protect investors, ensure fair and efficient financial 
markets, enhance transparency and market integrity, and prevent firms 
from engaging in misleading and deceptive conduct in the provision 
of financial products and services.139 
The Qatar Financial Centre Regulatory Authority is an 
independent regulator, the remit if which is to authorise and regulate 
firms and individuals conducting financial services.  It is a principles-
based regulator. Its objectives include the promotion and maintenance 
of efficiency, transparency, integrity and confidence, as well as the 
maintenance of financial stability and the reduction of systemic risk. 
Its remit also includes the development of financial awareness and 
protection for customers and investors.140 
Interestingly, Qatar has established a Qatar Financial Centre 
(QFC) Civil and Commercial Court, for resolving disputes between 
financial firms and their counterparties, and for the arbitration or the 
formal resolution of civil disputes. Qatar has also established the QFC 
Regulatory Tribunal for hearing appeals by entities, individuals and 
corporate bodies against decisions of the QFC Regulatory 
Authority.141 
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(d) Spain 
In Spain, the Spanish regime includes three authorities: the Bank of 
Spain, the National Securities Market Commission (Comisión 
Nacional del Mercado de Valores) (CNMV), and the Directorate 
General of Insurance and Pension Funds (Dirección General de 
Seguros y Fondos de Pensiones) (DGS). 
The Bank of Spain is responsible for prudential supervision 
and regulation.142 These functions are divided into two Directorates 
General: the Directorate General Banking Regulation and Financial 
Stability and the Directorate General Banking Supervision.143 The 
stated objective of the Bank’s supervisory process is to determine a 
risk profile for each institution, in order to provide the Bank of Spain 
with a capacity to maintain financial system stability, by foreseeing 
and preventing future bank crises.144 This risk profile aggregates the 
possibility of a credit institution developing solvency, profitability or 
liquidity problems in the future, into a single variable.145  
The method used by the Spanish Bank is known as 
‘Supervision of the Banking Activity By Risk Approach (SABER)’, 
which aims to provide a uniform ratings framework. The elements 
analysed are represented in a risk matrix, which represent different 
ratings, some of which are objectively quantifiable, some of which are 
subjective in nature, such as management and control.146 
The SABER aims to determine which institutions are more 
likely to develop problems in the future. Special attention is paid to 
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institutions with a supervisory risk profile above a certain rating. The 
supervision framework for the different institutions is based on the 
supervisory risk profile and systemic importance of the institution. 
The framework is updated as required, but always at least annually.147 
The Spanish National Securities Market Commission is 
responsible for supervising and inspecting the Spanish Stock Markets 
and the activities of all its participants.148 The CNMV’s remit is to 
ensure transparency in the Spanish market, correct price formation, 
and the protection of investors. The CNMV also promotes disclosure 
of information, in order to achieve investor protection.149 The CNMV 
audits and develops new disclosure requirements relating to 
remuneration schemes for directors and executives, linked to the 
company’s share price. It also aims to detect and pursue illegal 
activities by unregistered intermediaries. The Commission has 
jurisdiction over companies that issue securities for public placement, 
the secondary markets in securities, and investment services 
companies. The Commission also exercises prudential supervision 
over the last two in order to ensure transaction security and the 
solvency of the system.150 The entities over which the CNMV 
exercises its jurisdiction include: Collective Investment Schemes, 
which includes: investment companies (securities and real estate), 
investment funds (securities and real estate) and their management 
companies; Broker-Dealers and Dealers - entities engaging primarily 
in the purchase and sale of securities; and Portfolio Management 
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Companies - entities focusing primarily on managing individuals’ 
assets (principally securities).151 
The Spanish Directorate General of Insurance and Pension 
Funds regulates and supervises private insurance and reinsurance, 
insurance brokers and reinsurance and pension plans. It protects 
policyholders, beneficiaries, third parties and participants in pension 
plans through a complaints resolution process. It handles inquiries 
about insurance and monitors compliance.152 
The DGS examines the valuation of assets and liabilities, 
conducts overall compliance reviews, and conducts reviews and 
assessments of risks and solvency. It controls mergers and other 
transactions between insurance companies aimed at improving the 
structure of the sector, in conjunction with the National Markets And 
Competition Commission. In addition, the DGS is responsible for the 
supervision of market conduct.153 
 
(e) Australia 
The ‘Twin Peaks’ model was proposed by, and implemented on, the 
conclusion of the Wallis Commission of Inquiry in 1997.154 To wit, 
Australia has separated the market conduct and consumer protection 
authority – the Australian Securities and Investment Commission 
(ASIC) – from the bank regulator – the Australian Prudential 
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Regulation Authority (APRA) – and the National Central Bank (NCB) 
– the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA).  
The RBA is tasked with, inter alia, overall responsibility for 
the financial system, and is lender of last resort (LoLR). The 
Australian model could therefore reasonably be described as a three-
peak model. 
Each one of these peaks is an independent, statutory body.155 
While the Australian model provides a high degree of statutory 
independence for the system stability regulator,156 APRA, it is to a 
degree answerable to the Treasurer,157 and both APRA158 and ASIC159 
to the Federal Parliament by way of submission of Annual Reports. 
This comports with what Taylor envisages for the model as either 
Ministerial oversight or Parliamentary oversight.160   
The second entity is responsible for market conduct and 
consumer protection. It is argued such a system is more likely to 
resolve fragmentation, provide clarity of ambit, be more cost-effective 
due to rulebook simplification, and improve accountability – more 
likely, but not definitely, as the recent failings of ASIC in Australia 
have demonstrated.161 If the consumer protection and market conduct 
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regulator does prove effective, then advantages accrue to consumers 
for a ‘“one-stop shop”’162 for complaints against a regulated firm. 
While in Australia the prudential regulator is an entity separate 
from the National Central Bank (NCB), such ‘non-monopolist’ 
arrangements are not universal – that is to say there are instances 
where the regulator is part of the NCB (monopolist regimes, such as 
the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom), and others 
where the regulator is separate.  
There is no definitive answer as to which regime is preferable, 
but the available evidence favours a non-monopolist approach.163 
Banking sectors in ‘monopolist’ countries are more protected 
and somehow less developed and efficient than those in ‘non-
monopolist’ countries.164 
There are, in addition, conflicts of interest165 that ought to be 
considered in the location of the PA. The NCB’s focus is primarily a 
macro-prudential one, whereas the PA’s focus is chiefly micro-
prudential. Consequently, as lender of last resort, the NCB may find 
itself under pressure to assist regulated institutions, when the PA is 
located within the NCB. We argue that such conflicts of interest are 
best avoided. 
                                                                                                                  
 
Banking Bad; Jane Lee, Cameron Houston & Chris Vedelago, “CBA customers lose 
homes amid huge fraud claim”, ‘Victoria’, The Age, 29 May, 2014. 
162 Michael W. Taylor, December, 1995, p. 11. 
163 Carmine Di Noia & Giorgio Di Giorgio, “Should banking supervision and 
monetary policy tasks be given to different agencies?”, International Finance, Vol. 
2, no. 3 (November, 1999), pp. 361, 372/3/4/5/6/8. Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, “Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision”, Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision, Bank for International Settlements, September, 2012, § 41, 
p. 10; Adrian Fisk & Ian Pollari, “Financial System Inquiry, KPMG Submission”, 
series edited by Klynveld Peat Main Goerdeler, in Financial Services, Financial 
Services, KPMG, 31 March, 2014, p. 6. 
164 Carmine Di Noia & Giorgio Di Giorgio, op cit, p. 376. 
165 Ibid, p. 368. 
Approaches to Financial System Regulation 
 43 
Within this more usual context, the conflict of interest may arise 
between the monetary authorities, who wish for higher rates 
(e.g. to maintain an exchange rate peg, to bear down on 
inflation, or to reduce the pace of monetary growth), and the 
regulatory authorities who are frightened about the adverse 
effects such higher rates may have upon the bad debts, 
profitability, capital adequacy and solvency of the banking 
system.166 
A further instance for potential conflicts of interest between 
the NCB and the PA, include the expectation that the NCB will be 
influenced by stability considerations, when determining monetary 
policy,167 or that the NCB may employ open market operations and 
access to the discount window as a supervisory instrument.168 
Lastly, Di Noia et al169 assert that conflicts may arise between 
macro (monetary) and micro (regulatory) policy. Monetary policy 
tends to be anti-cyclical, whereas regulatory policy tends to be pro-
cyclical.170 Di Noia et al171 cite an example where, during an economic 
slowdown, a bank’s non-performing assets may increase, precipitating 
higher loan-loss provisioning rules, and a pressure to increase the 
quality of the bank’s portfolio from the Regulator. As Tuya et al172 
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point-out, this leads to a restriction in credit, at precisely the time 
when monetary policy should be expansionary. 
In terms of inter-agency co-operation and co-ordination, the 
Australian model addresses this through various memoranda of 
understanding.173  
Whereas the legislative framework for regulatory co-
ordination is high-level and outcomes-focused, it does not, however, 
provide detailed provisions as to the nature of co-ordination and how 
it should be achieved.174 Instead, s 10A of the APRA Act175 provides in 
general terms as follows:  
(1) The Parliament intends that APRA should, in performing 
and exercising its functions and powers, have regard to the 
desirability of APRA coordinating with other financial sector 
supervisory agencies, and with other agencies specified in 
regulations for the purposes of this subsection. (2) This section 
does not override any restrictions that would otherwise apply to 
APRA or confer any powers on APRA that it would not 
otherwise have. 
The RBA has asserted that cultivating a culture of co-
ordination, under which the main focus is on regulatory performance, 
rather than regulatory structure, is crucially important. The Assistant 
Governor (Financial) of the RBA has attributed the efficacy of co-
ordination between the regulators in Australia to a culture -  
‘where we regard cooperation with the other agencies as an 
important part of our job, and there is a strong expectation 
from the public and the government that we will continue to do 
so…Key aspects [of coordination] include an effective flow of 
information across staff in the market operations and 
macroeconomic departments of a central bank and those 
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working in the areas of financial stability and bank supervision. 
Regular meetings among these groups to focus on risks and 
vulnerabilities and to highlight warning signs can be very 
valuable. A culture of coordination among these areas is very 
important in a crisis because, in many instances, a stress 
situation is first evident in liquidity strains visible to the central 
bank, and the first responses may be calls on central bank 
liquidity.’176 
The success Australia achieved in addressing the challenges 
arising out of the Global Financial Crisis and the 2010 Sovereign Debt 
Crisis has been attributed to this flexible approach to inter-agency co-
operation. Indeed, in interviews conducted with the regulators in 
Australia, it was evident that over-prescription, or formalisation, 
would have stifled this flexibility.177 
To facilitate this co-operation, Australia has established the 
Council of Financial Regulators (CFR),178 whose purpose it is to 
oversee inter-agency co-operation. 
The CFR is the coordinating body for Australia’s main 
financial regulatory agencies. Its membership comprises APRA, 
ASIC, the RBA and the Treasury. ... It is a non-statutory 
interagency body, and has no regulatory functions separate 
from those of its four members.  
CFR meetings are chaired by the Reserve Bank Governor, with 
secretariat support provided by the RBA. They are typically 
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held four times per year but can occur more frequently... As 
stated in the CFR Charter, the meetings provide a forum for:  
• identifying important issues and trends in the financial 
system, including those that may impinge upon overall financial 
stability;  
• … appropriate coordination arrangements for responding to 
actual or potential instances of financial instability, and 
helping to resolve any issues where members’ responsibilities 
overlap;  
… 
Much of the input into CFR meetings is undertaken by 
interagency working groups, which has the additional benefit of 
promoting productive working relationships and an 
appreciation of cross-agency issues at the staff level.  
The CFR has worked well since its establishment and, during 
the crisis in particular, it has proven to be an effective means of 
coordinating responses to potential threats to financial 
stability…  
The experience since its establishment, and especially during 
the crisis, has highlighted the benefits of the existing non-
statutory basis of the CFR.’179 
While this arrangement may have succeeded in insulating 
Australia from the ravages of the GFC in respect of system stability, 
the Australian regulatory model has not fared as well in respect of 
combatting market misconduct, or the protection of consumers, as the 
financial advice scandals at the Commonwealth Bank (CBA) and 
Macquarie Bank have demonstrated.180 ASIC’s paltry performance in 
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addressing these malpractices at CBA and Macquarie were heavily 
criticised by an inquiry led by the Upper House of Australia’s Federal 
Parliament.181 Considering the international fashionability of ‘Twin 
Peaks’, and in particular the influence of the Australian model, the 
failures and shortcomings of ASIC – one half of the two peaks – has 
been a significant and sobering practical failure. 
In its Final Report, the Australian Financial System Inquiry 
has recommended that in the future Australia establish a Financial 
Regulator Assessment Board, the purpose of which would be to 
annually provide advice to the Government on how financial 
regulators have implemented their mandates, and ‘provide clearer 
guidance to regulators in Statements of Expectation and increase the 
use of performance indicators for regulator performance.’182 
This proposal has precedent in the UK, which has established a 
Financial Policy Committee (FPC), the remit of which is to look for 
the roots of the next crisis.183  Its remit is to identify, monitor and take 
action to remove or reduce systemic risks. It has a secondary 
objective, which is to support the economic policy of the 
Government.184   
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There are many elements that underpin the effectiveness of the ‘Twin 
Peaks’ system of financial regulation, under which there are separate 
regulators for prudential supervision and market conduct. These 
include a clear allocation of objectives and responsibilities between 
each regulator; effective co-ordination between the regulators; 
transparency and accountability on the part of each regulator; effective 
powers of supervision and enforcement; operational independence of 
each regulator (vis-à-vis the executive government); a sound 
governance system and adequate resources.185 
However, even with all of these criteria in place, a ‘Twin 
Peaks’ regulatory system is no guarantee against financial crises or 
even financial distress, as was evident in the Netherlands during the 
GFC. Nor is ‘Twin Peaks’ a guarantee against financial firms 
engaging in market misconduct or consumer abuse, as the experience 
with ASIC and its oversight of the Commonwealth Bank and 
Macquarie Bank in Australia indicate, and as evidenced in the 
subsequent findings of the Senate of the Australian Federal 
Parliament. 
What ‘Twin Peaks’ does offer is a good start, by imposing 
what the evidence strongly suggests is the best and most optimal 
regulatory architecture. From there the avoidance of financial crises 
and market abuse will depend upon the culture and leadership of the 
two peaks, and their willingness to tackle difficult questions and 
powerful vested interests. That in turn is in large measure dependent 
upon the extent to which political leaders are insulted from industry 
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